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An	emerging	theme	in	normative	theory,	including	both	ethics	and	epistemology,	
is	 that	 there	 is	 an	 important	 distinction	 to	 be	 drawn	 between	 substantive	 and	
structural	requirements	of	rationality	(Scanlon	2007;	Worsnip	2018a).	The	goal	of	
this	 chapter	 is	 to	 examine	 this	 distinction	 as	 it	 applies	 within	 the	 epistemic	
domain.	What	is	the	relationship	between	substantive	and	structural	requirements	
of	epistemic	rationality?	
Substantive	rationality	is	a	matter	of	responding	to	reasons.	Scanlon	defines	
a	 reason	 for	 something	 as	 “a	 consideration	 that	 counts	 in	 favor	 of	 it”	 (1998:	 17).	
Given	the	flexibility	of	the	English	word	‘reason’,	however,	there	is	no	single	sense	
in	which	reasons	count	 in	 favor	of	belief	or	action	(Schroeder	2008).	For	current	
purposes,	 a	 reason	 to	ϕ	 counts	 in	 favor	 of	ϕ-ing	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 contributes	
towards	 making	 it	 substantively	 rational	 to	 ϕ.	 According	 to	 evidentialism	 in	
epistemology,	 all	 reasons	 for	 belief	 are	 constituted	 by	 evidence.	 Given	 this	
assumption,	 substantive	 rationality	 in	 the	 epistemic	 domain	 is	 a	 matter	 of	
proportioning	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence.	
Structural	 rationality,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 a	matter	 of	 having	 beliefs	 and	 other	
attitudes	 that	 cohere	 or	 “fit	 together”	 in	 the	 right	 way.	 Although	 there	 is	 some	
controversy	about	which	forms	of	coherence	are	required	for	structural	rationality,	
the	 following	 requirements	 are	 widely	 endorsed.	 First,	 your	 beliefs	 should	 be	
logically	 coherent	 in	the	sense	that	they	are	logically	consistent	and	closed	under	
logical	 consequence.	 Second,	 your	 degrees	 of	 belief	 or	 “credences”	 should	 be	
probabilistically	 coherent	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 conform	 to	 the	 axioms	 of	 the	
probability	calculus.	And	third,	your	beliefs	should	be	meta-coherent	in	the	sense	
that	 your	 object-level	 beliefs	 cohere	 with	 your	 meta-level	 beliefs	 about	 which	
beliefs	you	should	hold.	
It	 is	 plausible	 that	 both	 substantive	 and	 structural	 requirements	 are	 built	
into	 our	 ordinary	 conception	 of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 An	 epistemically	 rational	
agent	 is	 one	whose	 beliefs	 are	 both	 coherent	 and	 proportioned	 to	 her	 evidence.	
Anyone	whose	beliefs	 are	 either	 incoherent	 or	 unsupported	by	her	 evidence	has	
thereby	violated	some	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality.	
Some	 theories	of	 epistemic	 rationality	 impose	no	 substantive	 requirement	
to	 respect	 your	 evidence,	but	 these	 theories	have	 little	 to	 recommend	 them.	On	
pure	versions	of	coherentism,	for	example,	epistemic	rationality	is	simply	a	matter	
of	 having	 beliefs	 that	 cohere	 with	 each	 other.	 Similarly,	 according	 to	 subjective	
Bayesianism,	there	is	nothing	more	to	epistemic	rationality	than	having	credences	
that	 are	 probabilistically	 coherent	 and	 updated	 by	 Bayesian	 conditionalization.	
These	views	are	subject	to	compelling	counterexamples.	Consider	Magic	Feldman,	
who	 combines	 Magic	 Johnson’s	 beliefs	 with	 Richard	 Feldman’s	 experiences	
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(Feldman	2003:	68).	Although	his	beliefs	are	coherent,	 they	are	not	epistemically	
rational.	Epistemic	rationality	requires	that	your	beliefs	cohere	not	only	with	each	
other,	but	also	with	the	evidence	provided	by	your	sensory	experience.	
Other	 theories	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 abandon	 any	 structural	
requirements	of	coherence.	On	a	global	version	of	phenomenal	conservatism,	for	
example,	epistemic	rationality	is	simply	a	matter	of	believing	whatever	seems	true	
(Huemer	 2001).	 Since	 there	 are	 no	 structural	 constraints	 on	 which	 propositions	
can	seem	true,	this	view	implies	that	epistemically	rational	agents	can	hold	beliefs	
that	are	wildly	incoherent	(Smithies	2019:	Ch.	12).	Arguably,	this	compromises	the	
value	of	epistemic	rationality	by	failing	to	preserve	the	structural	features	that	are	
distinctive	 of	 epistemically	 rationally	 agents.	 Any	 conception	 of	 epistemic	
rationality	 that	 deserves	 the	 name	 must	 recognize	 at	 least	 some	 structural	
requirements	of	coherence.	
This	 chapter	 begins	 from	 the	 plausible	 assumption	 that	 epistemic	
rationality	requires	both	coherence	and	respecting	your	evidence.	The	main	goal	of	
the	 chapter	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 these	 requirements.	What	 is	
the	relationship	between	the	substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence	and	
the	structural	requirement	to	be	coherent?	
Let’s	define	bifurcationism	as	the	thesis	that	the	substantive	and	structural	
requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	are	distinct	and	sui	generis	in	the	sense	that	
neither	can	be	explained	as	a	consequence	of	the	other.	On	this	view,	there	are	two	
fundamentally	different	kinds	of	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality,	neither	of	
which	can	be	reduced	to	the	other.	One	argument	for	bifurcationism	is	that	these	
requirements	 can	 come	 into	 conflict	 when	 your	 evidence	 supports	 incoherent	
beliefs.	 Thus,	 Alex	 Worsnip	 (2018a)	 argues	 that	 your	 evidence	 supports	 meta-
incoherent	 beliefs	 when	 it	 is	 misleading	 about	 itself.	 Such	 cases	 threaten	 to	
generate	 epistemic	 dilemmas	 in	 which	 you	 are	 guaranteed	 to	 violate	 either	 the	
substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence	or	the	structural	requirement	of	
meta-coherence.	
The	central	 thesis	of	 this	chapter	 is	 that	 there	can	be	no	conflict	between	
evidence	 and	 coherence.	 This	 is	 because	 there	 are	 structural	 constraints	 on	 the	
evidential	 support	 relation,	 which	 guarantee	 that	 your	 evidence	 never	 supports	
incoherent	beliefs.	Any	epistemically	 rational	agent	who	 respects	her	evidence	 is	
thereby	 guaranteed	 to	be	 coherent,	 since	 the	 evidence	 always	 supports	 coherent	
beliefs.	According	to	this	version	of	unificationism,	there	is	fundamentally	just	one	
requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality,	 which	 incorporates	 both	 substantive	 and	
structural	 dimensions.	 This	 is	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 to	 hold	 beliefs	 that	
cohere	with	 substantive	 facts	 about	 your	 evidence	 in	 accordance	with	 structural	
facts	about	the	evidential	support	relation.	
The	challenge	remains	to	explain	where	Worsnip’s	argument	goes	wrong.	I	
argue	that	your	evidence	cannot	be	misleading	about	itself	because	the	facts	about	
what	your	evidence	is	and	what	it	supports	are	always	self-evident	in	the	sense	that	
they	 are	 certain	 given	 your	 evidence.	 On	 this	 view,	 respecting	 your	 evidence	
guarantees	 that	 your	 beliefs	 are	 not	 only	 coherent,	 but	 also	 meta-coherent.	
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Moreover,	 I	explain	away	 intuitions	 to	 the	contrary	by	appealing	 to	a	distinction	
between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	
Here	 is	 the	 plan.	 §1	 presents	 a	 puzzle	 that	 arises	 from	 the	 bifurcationist	
assumption	 that	 there	 can	 be	 conflicts	 between	 evidence	 and	 coherence.	 §2	
critiques	 various	 bifurcationist	 solutions	 to	 the	 puzzle,	 while	 §3	 raises	 more	
general	problems	with	the	bifurcationist	assumption	that	generates	the	puzzle	 in	
the	 first	 place.	 §4	 presents	 my	 unificationist	 solution	 to	 the	 puzzle,	 while	 §5	
defends	 it	 by	 explaining	 away	 the	 intuitions	 that	 seem	 to	 favor	 bifurcationism.	
Finally,	§6	concludes	by	explaining	how	my	unificationist	solution	avoids	positing	
epistemic	dilemmas.	
	
1. A	Puzzle	about	Evidence	and	Coherence	
This	section	presents	a	puzzle	that	arises	from	the	bifurcationist	assumption	that	
there	can	be	conflicts	between	evidence	and	coherence.	The	puzzle	is	generated	by	
cases	 in	which	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 your	 evidence	 appears	 to	
conflict	 with	 the	 structural	 requirement	 to	 be	 coherent	 because	 your	 evidence	
supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 Such	 cases	 threaten	 to	 yield	 epistemic	 dilemmas	 in	
which	epistemic	 rationality	 issues	 logically	 inconsistent	 requirements,	but	 this	 is	
hard	 to	 stomach.	 Is	 it	 really	 tolerable	 to	 suppose	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	
sometimes	requires	us	to	do	what	is	logically	impossible?	
The	puzzle	can	be	presented	in	the	form	of	a	paradox:	
	
(1) Your	evidence	sometimes	supports	only	incoherent	beliefs.	
(2) Epistemic	rationality	always	requires	that	your	beliefs	are	supported	by	your	
evidence.	
(3) Epistemic	rationality	always	requires	that	your	beliefs	are	coherent.	
(4) Epistemic	rationality	never	issues	inconsistent	requirements.	
	
Each	of	these	four	claims	is	individually	plausible	but	they	are	jointly	inconsistent.	
If	your	evidence	supports	only	incoherent	beliefs,	then	you’re	guaranteed	to	violate	
a	 requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality,	 since	 you	 cannot	 respect	 your	 evidence	
while	 also	 remaining	 coherent.	 In	 such	 cases,	 you	 face	 an	 epistemic	 dilemma	 in	
which	epistemic	rationality	issues	inconsistent	requirements.	
Worsnip	 (2018a)	 explores	 a	 version	 of	 this	 puzzle	 that	 is	 generated	 by	
higher-order	 evidence:	 that	 is,	evidence	about	your	own	evidence.	The	key	 idea	 is	
that	when	you	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence,	your	total	evidence	can	be	
misleading	 about	 itself.	 For	 example,	 your	 total	 evidence	 can	 support	 the	
proposition	 that	 p	 while	 also	 supporting	 the	 higher-order	 proposition	 that	 your	
total	evidence	doesn’t	support	p.	In	that	case,	your	evidence	makes	it	substantively	
rational	to	believe	the	conjuncts	of	an	abominable	conjunction:	
	
p	but	I	shouldn’t	believe	p	because	my	total	evidence	doesn’t	support	p.	
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This	generates	a	version	of	Moore’s	paradox,	since	the	abominable	conjunction	is	
consistent	 and	 yet	 it	 nevertheless	 seems	 epistemically	 irrational	 to	 believe	 it	
(Smithies	 2012;	 Horowitz	 2014).	 Someone	 who	 believes	 the	 conjuncts	 of	 this	
conjunction	is	epistemically	akratic	in	a	way	that	seems	irrational.	Just	as	it	seems	
irrational	to	act	in	conflict	with	your	beliefs	about	how	you	should	act,	so	it	seems	
irrational	 to	 hold	 beliefs	 that	 conflict	 with	 your	 beliefs	 about	 what	 you	 should	
believe.	 Akrasia,	 whether	 practical	 or	 epistemic,	 is	 a	 paradigmatic	 form	 of	
structural	 irrationality.	 Nevertheless,	 Worsnip	 argues,	 your	 evidence	 makes	 it	
substantively	 rational	 to	 be	 epistemically	 akratic.	 Hence,	 there	 is	 an	 apparent	
conflict	between	structural	and	substantive	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	
Worsnip	illustrates	the	point	with	the	following	example:	
	
Miss	Marple	and	Mabel.	Miss	Marple	is	a	detective	who	is	famously	good	
at	assessing	evidence.	Miss	Marple	is	investigating	a	murder	that	took	place	
at	the	mansion	on	the	hill,	and	she	takes	her	great	niece	Mabel	along	with	
her.	 Miss	 Marple	 and	 Mabel	 set	 about	 the	 mansion	 collecting	 clues.	
Unfortunately,	 in	 their	 initial	 sweep	of	 the	house,	nothing	 that	 they	 learn	
offers	 any	 kind	 of	 significant	 support	 to	 any	 particular	 hypothesis	 about	
who	 committed	 the	 crime.	 As	 part	 of	 her	 training	 of	 Mabel	 as	 her	
apprentice,	after	they	have	finished	examining	a	crime	scene,	Miss	Marple	
always	 tells	 Mabel	 what	 [is]	 her	 own	 assessment	 of	 what	 the	 evidence	
supports.	On	 this	 occasion,	Miss	Marple	makes	 an	 uncharacteristic	 error,	
and	declares	to	Mabel,	“the	clues	lying	around	the	house	that	you	have	seen	
up	to	this	point	support	believing	that	the	vicar	did	it”.	(2018a:	24)	
	
Although	the	clues	themselves	are	not	probative,	Miss	Marple’s	expert	 testimony	
provides	higher-order	evidence	that	the	clues	incriminate	the	vicar.	According	to	
Worsnip,	Mabel’s	 total	evidence	supports	agnosticism	about	whether	 the	vicar	 is	
guilty,	 while	 also	 supporting	 the	 higher-order	 belief	 that	 her	 evidence	 supports	
believing	this	conclusion.	And	yet	it	seems	structurally	irrational	for	Mabel	to	hold	
meta-incoherent	beliefs,	which	she	might	express	as	follows:	“Given	my	evidence,	I	
should	believe	the	vicar	is	guilty,	but	I	refuse	to	believe	this.”	Hence,	Mabel	seems	
faced	with	an	epistemic	dilemma,	since	she	cannot	respect	her	evidence	while	also	
maintaining	meta-coherence.	
David	 Christensen	 (2007)	 gives	 similar	 examples	 in	 which	 you	 have	
misleading	evidence	about	your	own	logical	reasoning	abilities:	
	
Reason-Distorting	 Drugs.	 Suppose	 that	 I	 work	 out	my	 proof	 of	 T	 after	
having	 coffee	with	my	 friend	 Jocko.	 Palms	 sweaty	with	 the	 excitement	 of	
logical	progress,	I	check	my	work	several	times,	and	decide	that	the	proof	is	
good.	But	then	a	trusted	colleague	walks	in	and	tells	me	that	Jocko	has	been	
surreptitiously	 slipping	 a	 reason-distorting	 drug	 into	 people’s	 coffee	 –	 a	
drug	whose	effects	 include	a	strong	propensity	to	reasoning	errors	 in	99%	
of	those	who	have	been	dosed	(1%	of	the	population	happen	to	be	immune).	
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He	 tells	 me	 that	 those	 who	 have	 been	 impaired	 do	 not	 notice	 any	
difficulties	with	their	own	cognition	–	they	just	make	mistakes;	indeed,	the	
only	change	most	of	them	notice	is	unusually	sweaty	palms.	(2007:	10)	
	
Christensen	 argues	 that	 it’s	 irrational	 to	 be	 certain	 that	 T	 while	 doubting	 the	
reasoning	that	 leads	to	this	conclusion,	since	this	 is	a	 form	of	meta-incoherence.	
However,	your	evidence	that	you	have	ingested	the	drug	makes	it	rational	to	doubt	
your	own	reasoning.	And	yet	probabilistic	coherence	requires	being	certain	that	T,	
since	T	is	a	logical	truth	that	has	probability	1.	This	means	that	you	are	guaranteed	
to	violate	one	of	the	following	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality:	
	
LOGIC:	An	agent’s	beliefs	must	respect	logic	by	satisfying	(some	version	of)	
probabilistic	coherence.	
EVIDENCE:	An	agent’s	beliefs	(at	 least	about	logically	contingent	matters)	
must	be	proportioned	to	the	agent’s	evidence.	
INTEGRATION:	 An	 agent’s	 object-level	 beliefs	 must	 reflect	 the	 agent’s	
meta-level	beliefs	about	the	reliability	of	the	cognitive	processes	underlying	
her	object-level	beliefs.	(2007:	20)	
	
You	cannot	 respect	your	higher-order	evidence	about	your	own	reasoning,	while	
also	integrating	your	first-order	and	higher-order	beliefs	 in	a	meta-coherent	way,	
without	thereby	violating	probabilistic	coherence.	Hence,	you	seem	faced	with	an	
epistemic	 dilemma	 in	 which	 you	 are	 guaranteed	 to	 violate	 a	 requirement	 of	
epistemic	rationality.	
Some	epistemologists	deny	 that	meta-coherence	 is	a	genuine	 requirement	
of	epistemic	rationality	(Coates	2012;	Weatherson	2019;	Lasonen-Aarnio	2020).	And	
yet	 this	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 dissolve	 the	 puzzle.	 We	 can	 generate	 puzzle	 cases	
through	 apparent	 conflicts	 between	 LOGIC	 and	 EVIDENCE	 without	 invoking	
INTEGRATION.	In	the	simplest	cases,	you	receive	expert	testimony	that	T	is	false,	
when	in	fact	T	is	a	logical	truth.	In	such	cases,	you	need	not	have	any	misleading	
higher-order	 evidence	 about	 your	 own	 reasoning	 abilities.	 Even	 so,	 it	 seems	
plausible	that	the	expert	testimony	gives	you	misleading	evidence	about	logic.	But	
you	cannot	respect	this	evidence	without	violating	probabilistic	coherence.	
Some	 epistemologists	 deny	 that	 probabilistic	 coherence	 is	 a	 genuine	
requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 (Weatherson	 2019).	 But	 this	 is	 still	 not	
enough	to	dissolve	 the	puzzle,	 since	we	can	generate	apparent	conflicts	between	
evidence	and	coherence	without	making	any	assumptions	about	the	exact	form	of	
these	 coherence	 requirements.	 Whichever	 beliefs	 are	 prohibited	 by	 these	
coherence	requirements,	we	can	imagine	receiving	expert	testimony	that	provides	
misleading	 evidence	 that	 those	 beliefs	 are	 true.	 Hence,	 we	 cannot	 dissolve	 the	
puzzle	 by	 rejecting	 specific	 coherence	 requirements	 unless	 we	 make	 the	
implausible	claim	there	are	no	coherence	requirements	at	all.	
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2. Bifurcationist	Solutions	
This	section	examines	various	bifurcationist	strategies	for	solving	the	puzzle.	One	
of	 the	main	 arguments	 for	 bifurcationism	 is	 that	 the	 structural	 and	 substantive	
requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	are	distinct	because	they	conflict	when	your	
evidence	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 Hence,	 proponents	 of	 bifurcationism	
typically	 accept	 claim	 (1)	 and	 try	 to	 solve	 the	 puzzle	 in	 some	 other	 way.	 This	
section	examines	four	different	bifurcationist	strategies	for	solving	the	puzzle	and	
finds	problems	with	them	all.	
	
2.1. Epistemic	Dilemmas	
The	 first	 strategy	 is	 to	 reject	 claim	 (4)	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 never	 issues	
inconsistent	 requirements	 (Hughes	 2019).	 On	 this	 view,	 epistemic	 rationality	
always	requires	respecting	your	evidence,	and	always	requires	coherence,	although	
you	 cannot	 always	 satisfy	 both	 requirements.	 When	 your	 evidence	 supports	
incoherent	beliefs,	you	ought	to	hold	these	beliefs	because	they	are	supported	by	
your	evidence,	but	at	the	same	time	you	ought	not	to	hold	them	because	they	are	
incoherent.	These	cases	are	dilemmas	 in	the	strict	sense	that	they	 instantiate	the	
formal	schema	below:	
	
Dilemmas:	Oϕ	&	O¬ϕ	
	
There	 is	 no	 logical	 contradiction	 in	 the	 claim	 that	 there	 can	be	dilemmas,	 since	
O¬ϕ	doesn’t	imply	¬Oϕ.	Nevertheless,	this	claim	yields	logical	contradiction	when	
combined	with	standard	principles	in	deontic	logic,	such	as	the	following:	
	
Ought-Implies-May:	Oϕ	→	Pϕ	
Duality:	Pϕ	→	¬O¬ϕ	
	
Together,	these	two	principles	imply	that	Oϕ	→	¬O¬ϕ,	which	is	inconsistent	with	
the	thesis	that	there	are	dilemmas.	
Similarly,	we	can	derive	a	logical	contradiction	from	the	claim	that	there	are	
dilemmas	given	the	three	principles	below:	
	
Agglomeration:	Oϕ	&	Oψ	→	O	(ϕ	&	ψ)	
Ought-Implies-Can:	Oϕ	→	Cϕ	
Can’t	do	the	Impossible:	¬C	(ϕ	&	¬ϕ)	
	
Suppose	 there	 are	 strict	 dilemmas	 in	 which	 I	 ought	 to	ϕ	 and	 I	 ought	 not	 to	ϕ.	
Given	 the	 agglomeration	 principle,	 I	 ought	 both	 to	ϕ	 and	 to	 refrain	 from	ϕ-ing.	
Given	the	ought-implies-can	principle,	it	follows	that	I	can	both	ϕ	and	refrain	from	
ϕ-ing.	 And	 yet	 I	 cannot	 both	 ϕ	 and	 refrain	 from	 ϕ-ing,	 since	 this	 is	 logically	
impossible.	Once	again,	we	derive	a	logical	contradiction.	
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Hughes	 (2019)	 defends	 the	 coherence	 of	 dilemmas	 by	 rejecting	 the	
agglomeration	 principle	 and	 the	 ought-implies-may	 principle.	 And	 yet	 rejecting	
these	 principles	 comes	 with	 a	 significant	 theoretical	 cost	 in	 simplicity	 or	
explanatory	power.	Either	we	cannot	explain	the	correctness	of	patterns	of	deontic	
reasoning	 that	 are	 validated	 by	 these	 principles	 or	 else	we	must	 complicate	 the	
explanation	by	restricting	these	principles	so	they	don’t	apply	 in	full	generality.	 I	
doubt	these	costs	are	worth	paying	to	make	sense	of	epistemic	dilemmas.	
Moreover,	there	is	a	problem	with	the	very	idea	of	an	epistemic	dilemma	in	
which	epistemic	rationality	issues	inconsistent	requirements.	Epistemic	rationality	
is	a	dimension	of	epistemic	value:	there	is	always	some	value	in	being	epistemically	
rational,	 though	 it	may	be	outweighed	by	conflicting	values.	To	be	epistemically	
rational	 is	 to	satisfy	all	 the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	But	 if	 there	are	
strict	 dilemmas	 in	 which	 epistemic	 rationality	 issues	 inconsistent	 requirements,	
then	 it	 is	 logically	 impossible	 to	satisfy	all	of	 them	at	once.	And	there	can	be	no	
value	in	satisfying	all	the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	when	it	is	logically	
impossible	to	do	so,	since	there	can	be	nothing	of	value	 in	a	 logically	 impossible	
scenario.	Hence,	the	very	idea	of	an	epistemic	dilemma	compromises	the	value	of	
epistemic	rationality.	
Proponents	of	epistemic	dilemmas	may	retreat	to	the	claim	that	epistemic	
rationality	 is	 valuable	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 logically	 possible	 to	 achieve	 it.	 Rather	
than	compromising	the	value	of	epistemic	rationality,	however,	it	seems	preferable	
to	maintain	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 is	 always	 valuable	 by	 denying	 that	 it	 ever	
issues	 logically	 inconsistent	 requirements.	Arguably,	 it	 is	 an	 adequacy	 constraint	
on	 any	 theory	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 that	 it	 should	 delineate	 something	 that	
always	has	epistemic	value.	This	is	enough	to	motivate	the	search	for	a	solution	to	
our	puzzle	that	avoids	positing	epistemic	dilemmas.	
	
2.2. Prima	Facie	Requirements	
The	 second	 option	 is	 to	 treat	 the	 structural	 and	 substantive	 requirements	 of	
epistemic	 rationality	 as	 mere	 prima	 facie	 requirements	 to	 maximize	 various	
rational	 ideals,	 which	 can	 come	 into	 conflict	 (Christensen	 2007).	 On	 this	 view,	
there	can	be	conflicts	between	the	rational	ideals	of	coherence	and	respecting	your	
evidence.	Other	 things	equal,	you	should	maximize	each	of	 these	rational	 ideals,	
but	things	are	unequal	when	they	conflict.	In	such	cases,	you’re	not	required	to	do	
the	impossible:	namely,	to	be	perfectly	coherent	while	also	perfectly	respecting	the	
evidence.	Rather,	you	are	required	to	find	the	best	overall	balance	between	these	
rational	ideals.	As	Christensen	writes,	“We’re	quite	familiar	with	other	ideals	that	
operate	as	values	to	be	maximized,	yet	whose	maximization	must	in	certain	cases	
be	balanced	against,	or	otherwise	constrained	by,	other	values”	(2007:	24).	
On	 this	 view,	 conflicts	 between	 rational	 ideals	 do	 not	 generate	 strict	
dilemmas	 in	which	you’re	 required	both	 to	believe	and	 to	 refrain	 from	believing	
one	and	 the	 same	proposition.	At	best,	 these	 conflicts	 generate	dilemmas	 in	 the	
colloquial	sense:	that	is,	hard	cases	in	which	it’s	not	obvious	how	you	should	weigh	
conflicting	 values	 against	 each	 other.	 And	 yet	 some	 conflicts	may	 generate	 easy	
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cases	 in	 which	 it	 seems	 clear	 how	 they	 should	 be	 resolved.	 For	 example,	
Christensen	claims	that	it’s	not	rationally	optimal	to	be	probabilistically	coherent	
in	the	face	of	higher-order	evidence	of	your	own	cognitive	 imperfection.	 Instead,	
you	should	reduce	your	confidence	 in	 logical	 truths	when	you	have	higher-order	
evidence	that	your	logical	reasoning	is	impaired	–	say,	by	reason-distorting	drugs.	
In	 such	cases,	 the	value	of	probabilistic	coherence	 is	outweighed	by	 the	value	of	
respecting	the	evidence	about	your	cognitive	abilities.	
How	 does	 this	 view	 solve	 the	 puzzle?	On	 this	 view,	 (2)	 and	 (3)	 are	 false	
because	epistemic	rationality	doesn’t	always	require	respecting	your	evidence	and	
also	 remaining	 coherent.	 When	 your	 evidence	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs,	 it’s	
permissible	 to	 weigh	 these	 competing	 ideals	 against	 each	 other.	 Epistemic	
rationality	 requires	 only	 that	 your	 beliefs	 reflect	 some	 optimal	 balance	 between	
coherence	and	respecting	the	evidence.	
This	view	gives	a	more	plausible	treatment	of	hard	cases	than	treating	them	
as	 strict	 dilemmas.	 Consider	 Sartre’s	 (1946)	 example	 of	 the	 student	 deciding	
whether	to	join	the	French	resistance	to	the	German	occupation	or	instead	to	stay	
at	home	with	his	mother	who	depends	on	him.	It	seems	absurd	to	suggest	that	he	
should	do	both	 things	when	 this	 is	clearly	 impossible.	 It	 is	vastly	more	plausible	
that	he	should	pursue	whichever	course	of	action	is	supported	by	stronger	reasons,	
although	 it	 may	 be	 hard	 to	 ascertain	 where	 the	 balance	 of	 reasons	 lies.	 If	 the	
reasons	are	equally	balanced,	of	course,	then	it	may	be	permissible	to	pursue	either	
course	of	action.	
Unfortunately,	we	cannot	extend	the	same	treatment	to	the	examples	that	
concern	us.	In	Sartre’s	example,	there	is	a	conflict	between	substantive	reasons	for	
action,	 which	 derive	 from	 competing	 considerations	 about	 the	 value	 of	 helping	
your	 family	versus	 the	value	of	defending	your	nation.	What	you	ought	 to	do	 in	
such	cases	depends	on	the	overall	balance	of	substantive	reasons.	Our	examples,	in	
contrast,	do	not	 concern	conflicts	between	 substantive	 reasons,	but	between	 the	
substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 your	 reasons	 for	 belief	 and	 the	 structural	
requirement	 to	be	 coherent.	We	cannot	 resolve	 this	 conflict	by	 appealing	 to	 the	
overall	balance	of	substantive	reasons.	
The	objection	can	be	posed	as	a	dilemma.	Do	we	have	substantive	reasons	
to	be	coherent	or	not?	If	not,	we	have	no	model	for	weighing	substantive	against	
structural	considerations	in	determining	what	you	ought	to	believe.	This	imposes	
some	theoretical	pressure	to	say	that	we	have	substantive	reasons	to	be	coherent	
after	 all.	 But	 if	 so,	 the	 substantive	 reasons	 for	 belief	 provided	 by	 your	 evidence	
must	be	weighed	against	the	substantive	reasons	for	belief	provided	by	structural	
considerations	about	coherence.	And	this	is	to	reject	the	evidentialist	assumption	
that	 all	 substantive	 reasons	 for	 belief	 are	 provided	 by	 evidence	 alone.	
Evidentialism	 is	not	 sacrosanct,	of	 course,	but	 it	 is	plausible	enough	 to	motivate	
the	search	for	an	alternative	solution.	
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2.3. Rational	Indeterminacy	
The	 third	 option	 is	 that	 it’s	 indeterminate	 what	 you	 should	 believe	 when	
substantive	and	structural	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	come	into	conflict	
(Leonard	 2020).	On	 this	 view,	 conflicts	 between	 evidence	 and	 coherence	 do	not	
generate	epistemic	dilemmas	in	which	it’s	determinately	true	that	you	ought	and	
ought	 not	 to	 believe	 one	 and	 the	 same	 proposition.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 these	 are	
cases	in	which	it’s	indeterminate	what	you	ought	to	believe.	
In	a	supervaluationist	framework,	it’s	determinately	true	that	you	ought	to	
hold	a	belief	just	in	case	the	belief	is	required	by	every	maximally	consistent	way	of	
resolving	the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	When	your	evidence	supports	
incoherent	beliefs,	it’s	indeterminate	what	you	ought	to	believe	because	there	are	
multiple	ways	of	resolving	the	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality,	which	diverge	
in	 what	 they	 require.	 Some	 resolutions	 require	 coherence,	 while	 others	 require	
respecting	 your	 evidence,	 although	 none	 require	 both.	 Hence,	 there	 are	 no	
epistemic	dilemmas,	since	it	is	determinately	false	that	you	ought	both	to	respect	
your	evidence	and	to	be	coherent	in	such	cases.	
How	does	 this	 view	 solve	 our	puzzle?	On	 this	 view,	neither	 (2)	nor	 (3)	 is	
determinately	 true,	 since	 it’s	 not	 determinately	 true	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	
requires	you	to	respect	your	evidence,	or	that	it	requires	you	to	be	coherent,	when	
your	 evidence	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it’s	 indeterminate	
what	epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 in	 such	cases.	 Indeed,	 it’s	determinately	 false	
that	epistemic	rationality	requires	both	coherence	and	respecting	your	evidence	in	
such	cases.	Hence,	the	conjunction	of	(2)	and	(3)	is	determinately	false.	
I	have	no	objection	to	the	general	claim	that	it’s	sometimes	indeterminate	
what	you	should	believe	or	do.	I	see	no	special	reason	to	suppose	that	ethics	and	
epistemology	 are	 immune	 from	 indeterminacy.	 Arguably,	 though,	 this	 solution	
countenances	 too	 much	 normative	 indeterminacy,	 since	 it	 implies	 that	 the	
normative	 facts	 are	 indeterminate	 whenever	 conflicts	 arise	 between	 substantive	
and	 structural	 requirements	 of	 rationality.	Hence,	 this	 solution	 cannot	 vindicate	
intuitive	verdicts	about	what	we	should	believe	and	do	in	such	cases.	
Consider	 a	 pilot	 who	 has	 misleading	 evidence	 that	 she	 is	 suffering	 from	
hypoxia,	 but	 who	 calculates	 correctly	 that	 she	 has	 enough	 fuel	 to	 take	 a	 scenic	
detour	 en	 route	 to	 her	 final	 destination	 (Elga	 2013).	 Although	 her	 evidence	
supports	this	conclusion,	 it	seems	reckless	 for	her	to	decide	on	this	basis	 to	take	
the	detour,	 rather	 than	 flying	directly	 to	her	 destination,	 given	 the	higher-order	
evidence	 that	 she	 is	 cognitively	 impaired	 by	 hypoxia.	 Intuitively,	 she	 shouldn’t	
believe	or	act	on	the	conclusion	that	is	supported	by	her	evidence.	On	the	current	
proposal,	however,	it	is	indeterminate	whether	she	should	disrespect	her	evidence	
in	 this	way	or	 instead	violate	meta-coherence	by	believing	a	 conclusion	 that	 she	
regards	 as	 probably	 based	 on	 mistaken	 reasoning.	 Many	 will	 regard	 this	 as	 a	
counterintuitive	prediction	of	the	theory.	
Another	 problem	 is	 that	 this	 solution	 cannot	 vindicate	 the	 plausible	
theoretical	 principle	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 always	 requires	 respecting	 your	
evidence	 and	 remaining	 coherent.	 Bifurcationism	 promises	 to	 accommodate	 the	
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normative	force	of	both	requirements	by	allowing	that	they	can	conflict.	And	yet	
this	solution	cannot	maintain	that	both	requirements	retain	their	normative	force	
when	they	conflict,	since	 it	 implies	 that	 it’s	 indeterminate	which	one	you	should	
comply	 with.	 Worse,	 it	 implies	 that	 it’s	 determinately	 true	 that	 you	 shouldn’t	
comply	 with	 both	 requirements	 when	 they	 conflict.	 In	 other	 words,	 it’s	
determinately	false	that	you	should	always	respect	your	evidence	while	remaining	
coherent.	This	is	 implausible	enough	to	motivate	the	search	for	a	solution	to	our	
puzzle	that	can	accommodate	the	normative	force	of	both	requirements.	
	
2.4. Equivocation	
The	fourth	option	is	to	deny	that	there	is	any	single	sense	in	which	you	ought	to	
respect	 your	 evidence	 and	 to	 remain	 coherent	 when	 your	 evidence	 supports	
incoherent	 beliefs	 (Worsnip	 2018a).	 On	 this	 view,	 these	 cases	 involve	 conflicts	
between	normative	 domains,	 rather	 than	within	 a	 single	 normative	 domain.	We	
cannot	 understand	 the	 distinction	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements	in	terms	of	a	single	normative	concept	of	epistemic	rationality	that	
governs	what	we	should	believe.	Instead,	our	beliefs	are	governed	by	two	distinct	
and	 fundamentally	 different	 kinds	 of	 normative	 requirements	 that	 cannot	 be	
stated	using	the	same	normative	concept.	
How	 does	 this	 view	 solve	 our	 puzzle?	On	 this	 view,	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	
puzzle	 arises	 from	 an	 equivocation	 between	 two	 distinct	 normative	 concepts.	
There	is	no	single	normative	concept	of	epistemic	rationality	in	terms	of	which	we	
are	always	required	both	to	respect	our	evidence	and	to	be	coherent.	Hence,	there	
is	no	single	interpretation	on	which	both	(2)	and	(3)	are	true.	
This	 view	 has	 several	 advantages.	 First,	 it	 avoids	 strict	 dilemmas,	 which	
removes	any	pressure	to	revise	deontic	logic.	Second,	by	distinguishing	normative	
requirements,	it	promises	to	vindicate	the	plausible	theoretical	principle	that	you	
are	always	required	to	respect	your	evidence	and	to	remain	coherent.	Third,	since	
these	 requirements	 are	 fundamentally	 distinct,	 there	 is	 no	 danger	 of	
compromising	 evidentialism	 as	 a	 thesis	 about	 substantive	 reasons	 for	 belief	 by	
encroachment	 from	non-evidential	 considerations	 about	 coherence.	And,	 finally,	
since	 these	 requirements	 are	 incommensurable,	 there	 is	 no	 commitment	 to	 any	
common	scale	on	which	they	can	be	weighed	against	each	other.	
Despite	these	attractions,	however,	problems	remain.	One	problem	is	that	
it’s	hard	 to	make	sense	of	 intuitions	about	what	you	should	do	 in	conflict	 cases.	
According	to	the	equivocation	strategy,	there	is	one	sense	in	which	you	ought	to	
respect	your	evidence	and	another	sense	in	which	you	ought	to	remain	coherent.	
But	this	doesn’t	capture	the	intuitive	sense	that	it’s	better	for	the	pilot	to	maintain	
meta-coherence,	 rather	 than	 respecting	 her	 evidence,	 when	 she	 acquires	 the	
higher-order	evidence	that	she	is	hypoxic.	
Indeed,	 the	 equivocation	 strategy	 doesn’t	 even	 provide	 us	 with	 the	
conceptual	resources	for	asking	whether	it’s	better	to	respect	evidence	or	maintain	
coherence	in	conflict	cases.	After	all,	we	have	no	single	normative	concept	in	terms	
of	which	 these	 conflicting	 requirements	 can	 be	weighed	 against	 each	 other.	We	
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can	 ask	 what	 substantive	 rationality	 requires,	 and	 we	 can	 ask	 what	 structural	
rationality	requires,	but	we	cannot	coherently	ask	which	of	these	requirements	are	
better	to	follow.	And	yet	it	does	seem	like	we	can	coherently	ask	this	question,	or	
something	like	it,	when	we	consider	the	hypoxia	case.	
Perhaps	the	deepest	problem	is	that	we	lose	the	attractive	idea	that	there	is	
any	 unified	 virtue	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 that	 requires	 both	 coherence	 and	
respecting	 your	 evidence.	 According	 to	 the	 equivocation	 strategy,	 there	 is	 a	
substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence,	and	a	structural	requirement	to	
be	 coherent,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 single	 concept	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 that	 unifies	
these	requirements.	Moreover,	we	cannot	reconstruct	a	unified	virtue	of	epistemic	
rationality	by	simply	conjoining	these	requirements.	After	all,	there	is	always	some	
value	in	epistemic	rationality,	but	there	is	no	value	in	satisfying	both	substantive	
and	structural	requirements	when	they	conflict,	since	this	 is	 logically	 impossible.	
There	is	no	value	in	what	is	logically	impossible.	
	
3. Problems	for	Bifurcationism	
The	 previous	 section	 raised	 problems	 for	 bifurcationist	 attempts	 to	 solve	 the	
puzzle,	 whereas	 this	 section	 raises	more	 general	 problems	 for	 the	 bifurcationist	
assumption	 that	 generates	 the	 puzzle	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 I	 argue	 that	 we	 should	
reject	 the	 bifurcationist	 assumption	 that	 your	 evidence	 can	 support	 incoherent	
beliefs.	 Instead,	 we	 should	 prefer	 a	 more	 unified	 conception	 of	 epistemic	
rationality,	 which	 builds	 the	 structural	 requirements	 of	 coherence	 into	 the	
substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence.	We	should	prefer	unificationism	
to	 bifurcationism	 because	 (i)	 it	 is	more	 parsimonious,	 (ii)	 it	 better	 explains	 the	
value	 of	 coherence,	 and	 (iii)	 the	 distinction	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements	 is	 dubiously	 intelligible	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Let’s	 take	 these	 three	
points	in	reverse	order.	
	
3.1. No	Intelligible	Distinction	
My	 first	 argument	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	 intelligible	distinction	between	 substantive	
and	structural	 requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	We	cannot	ultimately	make	
sense	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 some	 requirements	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 are	 purely	
substantive,	rather	than	structural,	or	vice	versa.	As	Ralph	Wedgwood	writes,	this	
is	“a	distinction	without	a	difference”	(2017:	11).	
Consider	first	the	requirement	to	proportion	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence.	
Can	 we	make	 any	 sense	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 requirement	 is	 purely	 substantive	
rather	 than	 structural?	 The	 requirement	 is	 that	 your	 degree	 of	 belief	 in	 a	
proposition	 should	 be	 proportionate	 with	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 your	 evidence	
supports	 that	 proposition.	 But	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 your	 evidence	 supports	 a	
proposition	depends	not	only	on	substantive	facts	about	what	your	evidence	is,	but	
also	on	structural	facts	about	the	evidential	support	relation.	Without	invoking	the	
structure	of	the	evidential	support	relation,	we	cannot	explain	how	your	evidence	
supports	 any	 given	proposition	 to	 any	 given	degree.	Hence,	 there	 is	 a	 structural	
dimension	built	into	the	requirement	to	proportion	your	beliefs	to	the	evidence.	
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Why	 is	 it,	 for	 example,	 that	 your	 evidence	never	 supports	 contradictions?	
This	 is	 because	 there	 are	 logical	 constraints	 built	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
evidential	 support	 relation.	Your	evidence	 supports	a	contradiction,	p	 and	not-p,	
only	if	it	supports	both	conjuncts.	But	your	evidence	cannot	support	a	proposition	
while	 also	 supporting	 its	 negation.	 These	 logical	 constraints	 on	 the	 evidential	
support	relation	are	best	captured	within	a	probabilistic	framework,	according	to	
which	your	evidence	supports	a	proposition	only	if	it	is	more	probable	than	not	on	
your	evidence	that	 it	 is	 true.	 It	cannot	be	that	a	proposition	and	its	negation	are	
both	more	probable	 than	not	 to	be	 true,	 since	 the	probability	of	 the	disjunction	
must	sum	to	one.	Hence,	your	evidence	never	supports	contradictory	propositions.	
Now	consider	 the	 requirement	 to	be	coherent.	Can	we	make	any	sense	of	
the	 idea	 that	 this	 requirement	 is	 purely	 structural	 rather	 than	 substantive?	
Coherence	requires	that	your	beliefs	stand	in	certain	relations	to	your	other	beliefs	
and	mental	 states.	This	 requirement	has	 a	 structural	dimension,	which	concerns	
the	 structure	 of	 the	 relations	 that	 must	 hold	 between	 your	 beliefs	 and	 other	
mental	states.	But	it	also	has	a	substantive	dimension,	which	concerns	the	mental	
states	that	fall	within	its	scope.	
Which	mental	 states	 fall	within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 coherence	 requirement?	
The	 most	 plausible	 answer	 is	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 your	 beliefs	 to	
cohere	not	 just	with	your	other	beliefs,	but	 also	with	all	 the	other	mental	 states	
that	provide	you	with	evidence.	The	assumption	here	is	not	that	your	evidence	is	
exhausted	by	facts	about	your	mental	states,	but	merely	that	you	possess	evidence	
in	 virtue	 of	 being	 in	 certain	 mental	 states.	 I	 claim	 that	 your	 beliefs	 are	 fully	
coherent	when	they	fit	together	in	the	right	way	with	all	the	mental	states	in	virtue	
of	which	you	possess	evidence.	
Epistemic	rationality	requires	that	your	beliefs	cohere	with	each	other.	This	
is	a	consequence	of	the	fact	that	your	beliefs	provide	you	with	defeasible	evidence,	
which	 may	 be	 defeated	 by	 the	 evidence	 provided	 by	 other	 beliefs.	 Plausibly,	
however,	your	experiences	provide	you	with	evidence	as	well	as	your	beliefs.	This	
means	 that	 your	 beliefs	 can	 cohere	with	 each	 other	 without	 cohering	 in	 all	 the	
ways	that	matter	for	epistemic	rationality.	Magic	Feldman	is	a	case	in	point:	he	is	
epistemically	irrational	because	his	beliefs	cohere	with	each	other	but	not	with	his	
experiences.	 Epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 that	 his	 beliefs	 cohere	 with	 all	 the	
mental	states	that	provide	him	with	evidence,	including	his	experiences	as	well	as	
his	other	beliefs.	
Epistemic	rationality	doesn’t	 require	that	your	beliefs	cohere	with	all	your	
mental	 states.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 not	 epistemically	 irrational	 to	 believe	 a	
proposition	while	 subdoxastically	 representing	 its	 negation	 in	 a	mental	module.	
This	 is	 because	 your	 subdoxastic	mental	 representations,	 unlike	 your	 beliefs,	 do	
not	 provide	 you	 with	 evidence.	 Epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 that	 your	 beliefs	
cohere	with	all	and	only	those	mental	states	that	provide	you	with	evidence.	
How	exactly	should	your	beliefs	cohere	with	the	mental	states	that	provide	
you	 with	 evidence?	 The	 most	 plausible	 answer	 is	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
coherence	 requirement	 derives	 from	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	
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relation.	Your	beliefs	should	cohere	with	the	mental	states	that	provide	you	with	
evidence	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	
Hence,	the	coherence	requirement	for	epistemic	rationality	is	none	other	than	the	
requirement	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	your	evidence.	
The	upshot	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	 intelligible	distinction	between	 substantive	
and	structural	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	Fundamentally,	 there	 is	 just	
one	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality,	which	incorporates	both	substantive	and	
structural	 dimensions.	 This	 is	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 to	 proportion	 your	
beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	the	sense	that	they	cohere	with	substantive	facts	about	
your	 evidence	 in	 accordance	 with	 structural	 facts	 about	 the	 evidential	 support	
relation.	If	your	beliefs	are	fully	proportioned	to	the	evidence,	then	they	are	fully	
coherent,	and	also	vice	versa.	Coherence	and	respecting	the	evidence	are	two	sides	
of	the	same	coin.	
	
3.2. The	Value	of	Coherence	
My	 second	 argument	 concerns	 the	 value	 of	 coherence.	 If	 unificationism	 is	 true,	
then	 the	 value	of	 coherence	 consists	 in	 the	 value	of	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	 If	
bifurcationism	is	true,	however,	the	value	of	coherence	is	much	harder	to	explain.	
What	 is	 the	 value	 of	 coherence	 when	 it	 comes	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 respecting	 your	
evidence?	Does	it	have	any	genuine	epistemic	value	or	does	it	merely	reflect	some	
fetish	for	neat	and	tidy	belief	systems?	And	if	coherence	has	no	genuine	epistemic	
value,	 then	 what	 is	 the	 normative	 force	 of	 the	 structural	 requirement	 to	 be	
coherent?	Do	we	have	any	good	reason	to	be	coherent?	
One	answer	is	that	coherence	has	intrinsic	value.	This	has	some	plausibility	
given	 the	unificationist	 view	 that	 the	value	of	 coherence	 consists	 in	 the	value	of	
respecting	 your	 evidence.	 And	 yet	 it	 is	 much	 less	 plausible	 that	 coherence	 has	
intrinsic	value	when	it	results	from	disrespecting	your	evidence.	As	Niko	Kolodny	
writes,	 “It	 seems	 outlandish	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 psychic	 tidiness	 that	 .	 .	 .	 formal	
coherence	enjoins	should	be	set	alongside	such	final	ends	as	pleasure,	friendship,	
and	knowledge”	(2007:	241).	
A	 second	 answer	 is	 that	 coherence	 has	 instrumental	 value	 because	 it	 is	 a	
means	 to	 an	 end	 that	 has	 intrinsic	 value	 –	 namely,	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	
Again,	 this	 claim	 has	 some	 plausibility	 given	 the	 unificationist	 view	 that	 your	
evidence	always	supports	coherent	beliefs,	since	your	beliefs	must	be	coherent	to	
respect	 your	 evidence.	 And	 yet	 it	 is	much	 less	 plausible	 given	 the	 bifurcationist	
view	that	your	evidence	can	support	incoherent	beliefs.	How	is	coherence	a	means	
to	 the	 end	 of	 respecting	 your	 evidence	 in	 such	 cases?	 If	 conflict	 cases	 are	 rare	
enough,	 then	 perhaps	 coherence	 is	 a	 reliable	 though	 not	 infallible	 way	 of	
respecting	your	evidence.	Once	we	divorce	evidence	and	coherence,	however,	it	is	
far	from	clear	that	conflict	cases	will	be	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule.	
A	 third	 answer	 is	 that	 coherence	 has	 instrumental	 value	 because	 it	 is	 a	
necessary	condition	for	agency,	the	capacity	to	act	on	beliefs	and	desires.	If	there	
are	 coherence	 constraints	 built	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 agency,	 then	 perhaps	 we	 can	
derive	 the	 value	 of	 coherence	 from	 the	 value	 of	 agency.	 The	 assumption	 is	
	 14	
questionable,	since	it	is	not	clear	why	a	Lewisian	madman	cannot	act	on	the	basis	
of	beliefs	and	desires	that	are	completely	incoherent	(Smithies	et	al.	forthcoming).	
Even	granting	this	assumption,	however,	problems	remain.	
One	 problem	 is	 that	 any	 coherence	 constraints	 on	 agency	 must	 be	
extremely	 weak.	 Perfect	 coherence	 cannot	 be	 required	 for	 agency,	 since	 human	
agents	fall	well	short	of	this	demanding	threshold.	At	best,	agency	requires	some	
minimal	degree	of	coherence.	So	what	explains	the	added	value	of	increasing	your	
degree	 of	 coherence	 beyond	 this	 minimal	 threshold?	 Presumably,	 it	 is	 not	
necessary	for	being	an	agent	that	you	increase	your	degree	of	coherence	so	long	as	
you	meet	the	minimal	threshold	to	qualify	as	an	agent	in	the	first	place.	
Another	general	problem	with	this	strategy	is	that	it	presupposes	the	value	
of	agency	without	explaining	it.	Why	are	we	entitled	to	this	assumption?	As	David	
Enoch	 (2006)	 articulates	 the	 question,	why	 should	we	 care	 about	agency,	 rather	
than	schmagency?	As	I’ll	explain,	this	challenge	is	especially	urgent	for	proponents	
of	bifurcationism	who	build	coherence	constraints	into	the	nature	of	agency.	
Consider	 Worsnip’s	 (2018a)	 bifurcationist	 thesis	 that	 your	 total	 evidence	
can	support	an	incoherent	set	of	beliefs.	Now	combine	this	with	Worsnip’s	(2018b)	
claim	that	a	set	of	beliefs	is	incoherent	just	in	case	it	is	partially	constitutive	of	the	
nature	of	belief	that	any	agent	is	disposed	to	revise	those	beliefs	under	conditions	
of	full	self-knowledge.	A	consequence	of	these	two	claims	is	that	there	cannot	be	
an	 ideal	 epistemic	 agent	 whose	 beliefs	 are	 always	 perfectly	 proportioned	 to	 her	
evidence.	Whenever	her	evidence	supports	incoherent	beliefs,	such	an	agent	holds	
incoherent	beliefs	under	conditions	of	 full	 self-knowledge	with	no	disposition	 to	
abandon	 them.	 But	 Worsnip’s	 account	 of	 incoherence	 excludes	 this	 possibility,	
since	it	is	inconsistent	with	the	coherence	constraints	on	the	nature	of	belief.	
This	is	a	surprising	result.	It	is	often	thought	to	be	possible	in	principle,	if	
not	 in	 practice,	 that	 there	 could	 be	 an	 ideal	 epistemic	 agent	 whose	 beliefs	 are	
always	perfectly	proportioned	to	her	evidence.	And	yet	this	possibility	is	excluded	
by	 combining	 Worsnip’s	 bifurcationism	 with	 his	 account	 of	 incoherence.	 More	
importantly,	 anyone	who	bites	 this	bullet	 faces	 an	awkward	normative	question.	
What	is	the	normative	significance	of	the	fact	that	the	constitutive	nature	of	belief	
precludes	incoherence	under	conditions	of	full	self-knowledge?	Is	it	a	good	thing	
because	 it	 provides	 us	with	 some	protection	 against	 incoherence?	Or	 is	 it	 a	 bad	
thing	 because	 it	 imposes	 an	 obstacle	 that	 prevents	 us	 from	 proportioning	 our	
proportioning	our	beliefs	to	the	evidence?	
The	second	answer	is	hard	to	avoid.	The	nature	of	belief,	desire,	and	agency	
is	normatively	defective	insofar	as	it	excludes	the	possibility	of	proportioning	your	
beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	conflict	cases.	Given	the	value	of	substantive	rationality,	
it	would	be	better	not	to	be	an	agent	with	beliefs	and	desires,	since	the	coherence	
constraints	 on	 agency	 pose	 an	 obstacle	 to	 substantive	 rationality.	 It	 would	 be	
better	 to	 have	 belief-like	 and	 desire-like	 states	 that	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 these	
coherence	 constraints.	 In	Enoch’s	 terms,	 it	would	be	better	 to	be	 a	 “schmagent”	
with	“schmeliefs”	and	“schmesires”,	rather	than	an	agent	with	beliefs	and	desires.		
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I	 conclude	 that	 proponents	 of	 bifurcationism	 cannot	 derive	 the	 value	 of	
coherence	 from	 the	 value	 of	 agency.	 More	 generally,	 I	 suspect	 that	 we	 cannot	
explain	 the	 value	 of	 coherence	without	 endorsing	 the	 unificationist	 view	 that	 it	
reduces	to	the	value	of	respecting	your	evidence.	
	
3.3. Occam’s	Razor	
My	third	and	final	argument	is	an	appeal	to	theoretical	parsimony.	Bifurcationism	
says	 that	 the	substantive	and	structural	 requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	are	
distinct	and	sui	generis.	My	version	of	unificationism,	in	contrast,	says	there	is	just	
one	requirement	of	epistemic	rationality,	which	 incorporates	both	structural	and	
substantive	dimensions	–	namely,	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	your	evidence.	
Hence,	 parsimony	 favors	 this	 view	 by	 an	 application	 of	 Occam’s	 razor:	 don’t	
multiply	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality	beyond	necessity!	
This	 argument	 is	 not	 conclusive,	 of	 course,	 since	 Occam’s	 razor	 permits	
multiplying	 requirements	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 when	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 do	 so.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 enough	 to	 impose	an	argumentative	burden	on	proponents	of	
bifurcationism.	Do	we	have	any	good	reason	to	divorce	the	structural	requirement	
of	 coherence	 from	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 your	 evidence?	 One	
argument	 is	 that	 we	 need	 to	 recognize	 sui	 generis	 coherence	 requirements	 to	
explain	the	normative	difference	between	subjects	who	differ	in	coherence	without	
respecting	their	evidence.	In	response,	however,	I’ll	argue	that	we	can	explain	the	
intuitive	data	without	appealing	to	sui	generis	coherence	requirements.	
Consider	three	detectives	working	on	a	case	who	disagree	about	the	cause	
of	the	victim’s	death:	
	
• Amy	is	agnostic	about	whether	it	is	murder	or	suicide.	
• Beth	believes	it	is	murder,	rather	than	suicide.	
• Carl	believes	it	is	murder,	and	also	believes	it	is	suicide,	although	he	knows	
it	cannot	be	both	murder	and	suicide.	
	
Let’s	assume	that	only	Amy	succeeds	in	proportioning	her	beliefs	to	the	evidence,	
since	 the	evidence	 is	neutral	between	murder	and	suicide.	Hence,	Beth	and	Carl	
fare	 equally	 poorly	 in	 responding	 to	 the	 evidence.	 Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 an	
intuitive	sense	in	which	Beth	is	doing	epistemically	better	than	Carl,	since	at	least	
her	beliefs	are	coherent.	Bifurcationism	can	explain	this	easily.	Although	they	both	
violate	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 their	 evidence,	 only	Beth	 satisfies	
the	 structural	 requirement	 to	 have	 coherent	 beliefs.	 The	 challenge	 for	
unificationism	is	to	explain	the	intuitive	sense	that	Beth	does	epistemically	better	
than	 Carl	 without	 divorcing	 the	 structural	 requirements	 of	 coherence	 from	 the	
substantive	requirement	to	respect	your	evidence.	
My	response	is	that	Beth	is	more	reasonable	than	Carl	in	the	sense	that	she	
manifests	better	reasoning	dispositions,	which	dispose	her	to	succeed	in	respecting	
her	evidence	in	other	cases	(Lasonen-Aarnio	2010).	To	see	the	point,	suppose	this	
is	a	hard	case:	although	the	evidence	is	neutral	between	murder	and	suicide,	it	is	
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easily	confused	with	a	simpler	case	in	which	the	evidence	clearly	supports	murder,	
rather	 than	suicide.	Beth	 is	disposed	 to	proportion	her	beliefs	 to	 the	evidence	 in	
the	 easy	 case,	 but	 not	 the	hard	 case,	whereas	Carl	 is	 disposed	 to	 proportion	his	
beliefs	to	the	evidence	in	neither	case.	In	that	sense,	Beth’s	reasoning	dispositions	
are	more	responsive	to	evidence	than	Carl’s.	This	explains	the	intuitive	sense	that	
Beth	 does	 epistemically	 better	 than	 Carl	 without	 divorcing	 requirements	 of	
coherence	from	the	substantive	requirement	to	respect	the	evidence.	
I’m	assuming	that	Beth’s	reasoning	dispositions	are	imperfectly	sensitive	to	
evidence	in	such	a	way	that	she	respects	her	evidence	in	easy	cases	but	not	hard	
cases.	Of	course,	we	can	stipulate	a	case	in	which	Beth	has	coherent	beliefs	that	do	
not	result	 from	evidence-sensitive	dispositions	at	all.	But	now	I	 lose	my	 intuitive	
sense	 that	 she	 is	 doing	 epistemically	 better	 than	 Carl.	 Perhaps	 it’s	 just	 a	 lucky	
coincidence	that	her	beliefs	are	coherent	or	perhaps	there	is	some	explanation	that	
involves	no	evidence-sensitive	dispositions.	Either	way,	I	doubt	that	the	coherence	
in	her	belief	system	reflects	anything	of	epistemic	value.	
The	key	challenge	for	proponents	of	bifurcationism	is	to	explain	what	value	
there	 is	 in	coherence	when	 it	doesn’t	 result	 from	evidence-sensitive	dispositions.	
Otherwise,	there	is	no	need	to	bifurcate	structural	and	substantive	requirements	in	
order	to	explain	the	intuitive	normative	difference	between	subjects	who	differ	in	
coherence	while	 failing	 to	 respect	 their	 evidence.	Of	 course,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	
argument	 for	 bifurcationism.	 In	 the	next	 two	 sections,	 I’ll	 address	 the	 argument	
that	we	should	divorce	substantive	and	structural	requirements	because	they	can	
come	into	conflict	when	you	have	evidence	that	supports	incoherent	beliefs.	
	
4. The	Unificationist	Solution	
According	 to	 my	 unificationist	 proposal,	 there	 is	 just	 one	 fundamental	
requirement	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 –	 namely,	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 to	
proportion	 your	 beliefs	 to	 your	 evidence.	 Your	 beliefs	 are	 proportioned	 to	 your	
evidence	when	your	degree	of	belief	in	any	given	proposition	matched	the	degree	
to	which	your	evidence	supports	that	proposition.	Moreover,	the	degree	to	which	
your	evidence	supports	a	proposition	is	a	function	of	two	things:	substantive	facts	
about	 your	 evidence	 together	 with	 structural	 facts	 about	 the	 evidential	 support	
relation.	 Hence,	 the	 evidentialist	 requirement	 incorporates	 both	 structural	 and	
substantive	 dimensions:	 epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 that	 your	 beliefs	 cohere	
with	 substantive	 facts	 about	 your	 evidence	 in	 accordance	 with	 structural	 facts	
about	the	evidential	support	relation.	
How	does	this	version	of	unificationism	solve	our	puzzle	about	the	conflict	
between	evidence	and	evidence?	On	 this	 view,	 there	 can	be	no	conflict	between	
evidence	and	coherence	 (cf.	Kolodny	2007;	Kiesewetter	2017;	Lord	2018).	Anyone	
who	 respects	 their	 evidence	 is	 guaranteed	 to	 be	 coherent,	 since	 there	 are	
coherence	 constraints	 built	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	
These	structural	constraints	on	the	evidential	support	relation	guarantee	that	your	
evidence	 never	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 We	 can	 therefore	 maintain	 that	
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epistemic	rationality	always	requires	not	only	coherence,	but	also	respecting	your	
evidence,	without	countenancing	epistemic	dilemmas.	
Formal	theories	of	epistemic	rationality	typically	impose	logical	constraints	
on	the	evidential	support	relation.	These	constraints	explain	the	plausible	datum	
that	 epistemically	 rational	 agents	 are	 logically	 coherent.	 Epistemically	 rational	
agents	 have	 logically	 consistent	 beliefs	 because	 they	 always	 believe	 what	 their	
evidence	 supports	 and	 their	 evidence	 never	 supports	 logically	 inconsistent	
propositions.	 Similarly,	 they	 believe	 all	 the	 logical	 consequences	 of	 their	 beliefs	
because	the	evidential	support	relation	is	closed	under	logical	consequence:	
	
The	 Evidential	 Closure	 Principle:	 Necessarily,	 if	 p	 entails	 that	 q,	 and	 your	
total	evidence	supports	p	to	degree	n,	then	your	total	evidence	supports	q	to	
degree	n	or	greater.	
	
This	principle	implies	that	every	logical	truth	is	supported	to	the	maximal	degree	–	
namely,	certainty	-	by	every	possible	body	of	evidence.	After	all,	any	logical	truth	is	
entailed	by	anything	else	and	entailment	is	the	strongest	kind	of	support	relation.	
Hence,	this	principle	encodes	a	requirement	of	logical	omniscience:	since	all	logical	
truths	are	certain	on	your	evidence,	epistemic	rationality	requires	that	you	should	
be	certain	of	any	logical	truth	towards	which	you	adopt	any	doxastic	attitude	at	all.	
Some	 epistemologists	 take	 lottery	 and	 preface	 paradoxes	 to	 undermine	
logical	 consistency	 and	 closure	 requirements	 on	 epistemic	 rationality.	 However,	
the	 logical	 constraints	 on	 belief	 can	 be	 preserved	 in	 the	 form	 of	 probabilistic	
constraints	 on	 degrees	 of	 belief	 or	 credences	 (Christensen	 2004).	 On	 this	 view,	
epistemic	rationality	requires	that	your	credences	are	probabilistically	coherent	in	
the	sense	that	they	conform	to	the	axioms	of	the	probability	calculus:	
	
(1) For	every	p,	Pr	(p)	≥	0.	
(2) If	p	is	a	tautology,	then	Pr	(p)	=	1.	
(3) If	 p	 and	 q	 are	 mutually	 exclusive,	 then	 Pr	 (p	 ∨	 q)	 =	 Pr	 (p)	 +	 Pr	 (q).	
(Christensen	2004:	16)	
	
On	 a	 probabilistic	 conception	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation,	 degrees	 of	
evidential	 support	are	evidential	probabilities.	Epistemically	 rational	 thinkers	are	
probabilistically	coherent	because	the	evidential	support	relation	is	constrained	by	
the	axioms	of	the	probability	calculus.	In	particular,	epistemically	rational	thinkers	
are	 logically	 omniscient	 because	 it	 is	 an	 axiom	 that	 logical	 truths	 always	 have	
probability	1.	Hence,	probabilistic	coherence	also	encodes	a	requirement	of	logical	
omniscience.	
In	addition	to	these	logical	or	probabilistic	constraints,	we	should	recognize	
higher-order	 constraints	 on	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	 On	 a	 probabilistic	
conception	 of	 evidential	 support,	 these	 can	 be	 formulated	 as	 constraints	 on	
higher-order	probabilities,	such	as	the	following:	
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Probabilistic	Accessibilism:	Necessarily,	if	it	is	evidentially	probable	that	p	to	
degree	n,	then	it	is	evidentially	certain	that	it	is	evidentially	probable	that	p	
to	degree	n	(Smithies	2019:	230).	
	
The	 rationale	 for	higher-order	constraints	 is	 to	explain	why	epistemic	 rationality	
requires	meta-coherence.	 Intuitively,	 epistemically	 rational	 agents	 always	believe	
what	they	believe	they	should	believe.	Just	as	it	seems	irrational	to	act	akratically	
in	 conflict	with	 your	 beliefs	 about	 how	 you	 should	 act,	 so	 it	 seems	 irrational	 to	
believe	akratically	 in	conflict	with	your	beliefs	about	how	you	should	believe.	To	
explain	why	 epistemic	 akrasia	 is	 always	 irrational,	we	 need	 to	 recognize	 higher-
order	 constraints	 as	well	 as	 first-order	 logical	 or	 probabilistic	 constraints	 on	 the	
evidential	 support	 relation.	 Epistemically	 rational	 agents	 are	 meta-coherent	
because	 they	 always	 proportion	 their	 beliefs	 to	 their	 evidence	 and	 they	 always	
know	with	certainty	what	their	own	evidence	supports.	
This	higher-order	constraint	on	the	evidential	support	relation	is	extremely	
demanding,	 but	 I	 doubt	 we	 can	 settle	 for	 anything	weaker.	 For	 example,	 Adam	
Elga’s	(2013)	New	Rational	Reflection	Principle	doesn’t	require	being	certain	of	the	
evidential	probability	that	p,	so	long	as	your	credence	in	p	matches	the	weighted	
average	of	your	expectations	about	the	evidential	probability	that	p.	And	yet	this	
principle	is	not	strong	enough	to	prohibit	a	form	of	epistemic	akrasia	in	which	you	
are	certain	that	your	credence	is	irrational,	although	you	have	no	idea	whether	it	
should	be	higher	or	 lower.	To	 rule	 this	out,	we	need	 to	maintain	 that	 evidential	
probabilities	are	always	evidentially	certain.	
This	 higher-order	 constraint	 on	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation	 can	 be	
explained	as	a	consequence	of	two	more	basic	assumptions.	First,	necessary	truths	
about	the	evidential	support	relation	have	the	same	epistemic	status	as	necessary	
truths	 about	 logic.	 Just	 as	 logical	 truths	 are	 certain	 given	 any	 possible	 body	 of	
evidence,	 so	 are	 necessary	 truths	 about	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	 The	
normalization	 axiom	 assigns	 probability	 1	 to	 all	 necessary	 truths	 that	 hold	
throughout	 the	 epistemic	 space	 over	 which	 evidential	 probabilities	 are	 defined.	
These	epistemic	necessities	 include	necessary	truths	about	the	evidential	support	
relation	as	well	as	necessary	truths	about	logic.	This	yields	an	evidentialist	version	
of	 Titelbaum’s	 fixed-point	 thesis,	 according	 to	 which	 “no	 situation	 rationally	
permits	an	a	priori	false	belief	about	which	overall	states	are	rationally	permitted	
in	which	situations”	(2015:	293).	
Second,	 all	 contingent	 truths	 about	 your	 evidence	 are	 self-evident	 in	 the	
sense	that	they	make	themselves	evident:	
	
The	 Self-Evidence	 of	 Evidence:	 Necessarily,	 if	 your	 evidence	 includes	 (or	
excludes)	 the	 fact	 that	 p,	 then	 it’s	 evidentially	 certain	 that	 your	 evidence	
includes	(or	excludes)	the	fact	that	p.	
	
The	 claim	 that	 all	 evidence	 is	 self-evident	 is	 a	 plausible	 consequence	 of	 a	
phenomenal	 conception	 of	 evidence,	 according	 to	 which	 your	 evidence	 is	
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exhausted	by	phenomenally	 individuated	 facts	 about	 your	 current	mental	 states.	
On	 this	view,	you	have	 the	 same	evidence	as	your	phenomenal	duplicate	who	 is	
deceived	by	an	evil	demon,	since	there	is	no	difference	in	how	things	seem	to	you.	
Assuming	that	skepticism	is	false,	your	evidence	that	it	seems	to	you	that	p	favors	
the	 anti-skeptical	 hypothesis	 that	 p	 over	 the	 skeptical	 hypothesis	 that	 it	merely	
falsely	seems	that	p.	Arguably,	however,	since	your	evidence	is	consistent	with	the	
skeptical	hypothesis,	 it	doesn’t	 rule	 it	out	with	certainty,	but	merely	with	a	high	
degree	of	probability.	
In	contrast,	propositions	about	your	own	phenomenal	evidence	are	immune	
from	demonic	deception.	Your	phenomenal	evidence	can	be	misleading	about	how	
things	are	 but	 not	 about	 how	 things	 seem.	 This	 is	 because	 your	 evidence	 about	
how	things	seem	is	constituted	by	the	facts	about	how	things	seem,	rather	than	by	
second-order	 seemings	 that	 can	 misrepresent	 those	 phenomenal	 facts.	When	 it	
seems	that	p,	 it	 is	evidentially	certain	that	 it	seems	that	p,	since	your	evidence	is	
inconsistent	 with	 any	 skeptical	 possibility	 in	 which	 things	 seem	 otherwise.	 A	
demon	 can	 induce	 false	 beliefs	 about	 how	 things	 seem,	 but	 he	 cannot	 induce	
justified	 false	 beliefs	 by	 giving	 you	 misleading	 evidence.	 Your	 evidence	 never	
justifies	false	beliefs	about	how	things	seem,	since	your	evidence	about	how	things	
seem	is	constituted	by	how	things	seem.	Your	phenomenal	evidence	is	self-evident	
in	the	sense	that	it	entails	itself	and	thereby	makes	itself	certain.	
With	 these	 two	claims	 in	hand,	we	can	explain	why	your	evidence	always	
makes	 it	 certain	whether	 it	 supports	 any	 given	 proposition	 to	 any	 given	 degree.	
This	is	because	contingent	truths	about	your	evidence	and	necessary	truths	about	
the	evidential	support	relation	are	always	certain	given	your	evidence.	Necessarily,	
if	your	total	evidence	e	makes	it	evidentially	probable	for	you	that	p	 to	degree	n,	
then	it	is	evidentially	certain	for	you	that:	
	
(1) You	have	total	evidence	e.	
(2) If	you	have	total	evidence	e,	then	it	is	evidentially	probable	for	you	that	p	to	
degree	n.	
(3) Therefore,	it	is	evidentially	probable	for	you	that	p	to	degree	n.	
	
In	 sum,	 higher-order	 constraints	 on	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation	 can	 be	
explained	 as	 a	 natural	 consequence	 of	 a	 phenomenal	 conception	 of	 evidence,	
which	 can	 be	 motivated	 on	 independent	 grounds	 by	 appealing	 to	 standard	
internalism	intuitions	about	skeptical	scenarios.	
It	is	a	familiar	claim	that	epistemic	rationality	requires	logical	omniscience,	
but	this	can	be	regarded	as	a	special	case	of	the	more	general	claim	that	epistemic	
rationality	 requires	 evidential	 omniscience.	 Perfectly	 rational	 agents	 are	 not	 only	
certain	of	all	logical	truths	but	they	are	also	certain	of	all	truths	about	what	their	
evidence	is	and	what	it	supports.	This	requirement	may	seem	unduly	demanding,	
but	 it	 is	 a	 consequence	of	 the	plausible	 thesis	 that	 epistemic	 rationality	 requires	
respecting	 logic	 and	 evidence	while	 remaining	meta-coherent.	 If	 you	 violate	 the	
requirement	of	logical	or	evidential	omniscience,	and	you	integrate	your	reasoning	
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with	 your	 beliefs	 about	 logic	 and	 evidence,	 then	 your	 reasoning	 fails	 to	 respect	
logic	and	evidence.	Your	doubts	about	 logic	and	evidence	“trickle	down”	 in	ways	
that	 lead	you	 to	disrespect	 logic	and	evidence.	These	 requirements	are	not	mere	
scientific	 idealizations	 –	 that	 is,	 false	 predictions	 of	 a	 theory	 that	 can	 be	 safely	
ignored	 for	 practical	 purposes.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 normative	 ideals	 that	 non-ideal	
agents	can	approximate	towards,	although	we	can	never	realize	them	perfectly.	
The	view	outlined	 in	 this	 section	 is	developed	 in	greater	depth	and	detail	
elsewhere	(Smithies	2019).	My	main	aim	here	is	just	to	explain	how	this	view	solves	
our	puzzle	by	precluding	conflicts	between	evidence	and	coherence.	The	challenge	
that	remains	is	to	explain	away	the	intuitions	about	cases	that	generate	the	puzzle	
in	the	first	place.	I’ll	address	this	challenge	by	invoking	a	distinction	between	ideal	
and	non-ideal	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	
	
5. Ideal	and	Non-Ideal	Rationality	
As	we	saw	in	§1,	Worsnip’s	(2018a)	argument	for	bifurcationism	assumes	that	you	
can	 have	misleading	 higher-order	 evidence	 about	 what	 your	 evidence	 supports.	
For	example,	Miss	Marple’s	expert	testimony	gives	Mabel	misleading	higher-order	
evidence	 that	 her	 evidence	 incriminates	 the	 vicar.	 I	 deny	 this	 assumption.	 You	
cannot	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence	about	what	your	evidence	supports	
because	these	facts	are	always	certain	given	your	evidence.	
We	need	to	rethink	the	assumption	that	you	have	evidence	for	a	conclusion	
whenever	someone	credible	tells	you	that	it’s	true.	What	your	evidence	supports	is	
a	matter	that	depends	not	only	on	substantive	facts	about	what	evidence	you	have,	
but	 also	 on	 structural	 facts	 about	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation	 that	 apply	 to	
everyone.	The	structural	constraints	on	the	evidential	 support	 relation	guarantee	
that	your	evidence	cannot	be	misleading	about	logic	and	evidence.	All	contingent	
truths	about	your	evidence	are	self-evident	in	the	sense	that	they	make	themselves	
certain.	 Moreover,	 all	 necessary	 truths	 about	 logic	 and	 evidential	 support	 are	
certain	 given	 any	possible	 body	of	 evidence.	This	means,	 ironically	 enough,	 that	
when	you	receive	misleading	testimony	that	not-p,	your	evidence	makes	it	certain	
that	p,	when	this	is	a	truth	about	logic	or	evidence.	
Much	of	the	resistance	to	this	proposal	stems	from	the	following	argument,	
although	it	is	often	left	implicit:	
	
(1) Epistemic	 rationality	 always	 requires	 that	 you	 proportion	 your	 beliefs	 to	
your	evidence.	
(2) When	 you	 receive	misleading	 testimony,	 epistemic	 rationality	 sometimes	
requires	that	you	are	uncertain	or	mistaken	about	logic	and	evidence.	
(3) Therefore,	misleading	testimony	sometimes	provides	you	with	uncertain	or	
misleading	evidence	about	logic	and	evidence.	
	
As	 I’ll	 explain,	 however,	 this	 argument	 trades	 on	 an	 equivocation	 between	 ideal	
and	 non-ideal	 standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 By	 ideal	 standards,	 epistemic	
rationality	always	requires	proportioning	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence.	Since	your	
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evidence	is	never	misleading	about	logic	and	evidence,	however,	it	is	never	ideally	
rational	 to	 be	 uncertain	 about	 logic	 or	 evidence.	On	 this	 reading,	 premise	 (1)	 is	
true	 but	 premise	 (2)	 is	 false.	 By	 non-ideal	 standards,	 in	 contrast,	 epistemic	
rationality	 sometimes	 requires	 being	 uncertain	 or	 mistaken	 about	 logic	 and	
evidence.	But	this	is	because	non-ideal	rationality	requires	responding	to	evidence	
about	 your	 cognitive	 limitations	 by	 adopting	 strategies	 that	 diverge	 from	 the	
epistemic	 ideal	 of	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	On	 this	 reading,	 premise	 (2)	 is	 true	
but	premise	 (1)	 is	 false.	The	argument	 is	unsound	because	 there	 is	no	consistent	
interpretation	on	which	both	premises	are	true.	
Here	 is	 a	 simple	 example	 to	 illustrate	 the	 distinction	 between	 ideal	 and	
non-ideal	 standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 Suppose	 Holmes	 and	 Watson	 are	
working	 on	 a	 murder	 case	 and	 share	 all	 their	 evidence.	 The	 evidence	 is	
complicated	enough	that	it’s	not	obvious	which	conclusion	it	supports,	but	in	fact	
it	incriminates	the	butler.	Since	Holmes	is	an	expert	detective,	he	knows	that	the	
butler	is	guilty,	although	he	keeps	his	opinion	private.	Meanwhile,	Watson	doesn’t	
know	what	to	make	of	the	evidence,	since	this	is	not	his	field	of	expertise.	
What	 should	Watson	believe?	There	 is	 no	 single	 answer	 to	 this	 question.	
Deontic	terms	are	highly	context-sensitive	and	we	get	different	answers	depending	
on	how	we	interpret	them.	One	dimension	of	this	context-sensitivity	concerns	the	
distinction	between	more	and	less	demanding	normative	standards.	
In	one	sense,	Watson	should	believe	what	Holmes	believes,	since	this	is	the	
conclusion	that	is	supported	by	his	evidence.	Although	Holmes	and	Watson	differ	
in	 their	 response	 to	 their	 evidence,	 there	 is	no	difference	 in	what	 their	 evidence	
supports.	After	all,	they	have	exactly	the	same	evidence.	Moreover,	there	can	be	no	
difference	 in	 what	 this	 shared	 body	 of	 evidence	 supports,	 since	 the	 evidential	
support	relation	applies	to	everyone	in	the	same	impersonal	way.	Hence,	Watson	
should	believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	that	the	butler	is	guilty.	
In	 another	 sense,	 however,	Watson	 should	 remain	 agnostic.	 After	 all,	 he	
knows	that	–	unlike	Holmes	–	he	lacks	the	expertise	to	follow	the	evidence	where	
it	leads.	If	he	gets	lucky	in	this	case,	he	is	prone	to	go	awry	elsewhere,	since	he	is	
not	 reliably	 responsive	 to	 the	 facts	 or	 the	 evidence	 in	 hard	 cases.	 So,	 even	 if	 he	
forms	a	true	belief	that	is	supported	by	his	evidence,	he	is	not	reliable	enough	to	
acquire	 knowledge	 or	 justified	 belief.	 Moreover,	 Watson	 has	 enough	 evidence	
about	 his	 own	 cognitive	 limitations	 to	 know	 all	 this.	 Since	 he	 knows	 he	 cannot	
acquire	knowledge	or	justified	belief,	it	doesn’t	make	sense	for	him	to	try.	Instead,	
it	makes	sense	to	adopt	a	more	cautious	policy	that	 takes	his	evidence	about	his	
cognitive	limitations	into	account.	Hence,	Watson	should	remain	agnostic,	rather	
than	forming	any	opinion	about	the	case.	
These	 two	 answers	 reflect	 the	 distinction	 between	 ideal	 and	 non-ideal	
standards	of	epistemic	rationality.	 Ideal	 standards	of	epistemic	rationality	always	
require	respecting	your	evidence,	whereas	non-ideal	standards	sometimes	require	
responding	 to	 evidence	 about	 your	 cognitive	 limitations	 by	 adopting	 strategies	
that	diverge	from	the	epistemic	ideal.	Our	intuitive	judgments	about	what	people	
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“should”	 believe	 don’t	 always	 track	what	 their	 evidence	 supports,	 since	 they	 are	
often	more	sensitive	to	non-ideal	standards	of	epistemic	rationality.	
Someone	 might	 protest	 that	 Holmes	 and	 Watson	 don’t	 share	 the	 same	
evidence,	since	they	have	different	evidence	about	their	own	expertise.	This	is	true,	
of	course,	but	it	doesn’t	mean	they	have	different	evidence	about	the	murder	case.	
The	higher-order	evidence	doesn’t	change	the	evidential	probability	that	the	butler	
is	 guilty.	 The	 evidential	 probability	 of	 a	 hypothesis	 depends	 on	 how	 well	 the	
hypothesis	explains	all	the	evidence.	This	is	an	objective,	a	priori	matter	that	is	not	
affected	 by	 evidence	 about	 your	 own	 capacity	 for	 reasoning.	 The	 evidential	
probability	of	a	hypothesis	isn’t	affected	by	the	realization	that	you’re	too	tired	or	
distracted	 to	 reason	 clearly.	 This	 distorts	 the	 epistemic	 function	 of	 higher-order	
evidence	about	your	cognitive	limitations	(Christensen	2010:	203-4).	
I	propose	an	alternative	account	of	 the	epistemic	 function	of	higher-order	
evidence	(cf.	Smithies	2019:	Ch.	10;	forthcoming).	Rather	than	changing	what	your	
evidence	supports,	it	changes	which	response	to	your	evidence	is	required	by	non-
ideal	 standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 When	 you	 have	 higher-order	 evidence	
about	 your	 cognitive	 limitations,	 it	 makes	 sense	 to	 adopt	 epistemic	 policies	 to	
manage	them.	For	example,	it	makes	sense	for	Watson	to	remain	agnostic,	rather	
than	forming	an	opinion	about	the	case,	since	he	knows	he	cannot	reliably	follow	
the	 evidence	 where	 it	 leads.	 It	 doesn’t	 follow	 that	 his	 evidence	 supports	
agnosticism.	This	is	simply	the	best	epistemic	policy	for	managing	what	he	knows	
about	his	on	cognitive	limitations.	
We	 can	 make	 this	 proposal	 more	 precise	 by	 locating	 it	 within	 the	
framework	 of	 rule	 consequentialism,	 which	 evaluates	 rules	 by	 their	 expected	
consequences.	We	can	evaluate	 rules	 in	a	way	 that	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	distinction	
between	 following	a	 rule	and	merely	 trying	 to	 follow	a	rule.	Following	a	rule	 is	a	
kind	of	achievement:	merely	trying	to	the	follow	the	rule	does	not	guarantee	that	
you	 will	 succeed.	 When	 you	 have	 evidence	 that	 you	 might	 fail,	 the	 expected	
consequences	 of	 trying	 to	 follow	 a	 rule	 can	 diverge	 from	 the	 expected	
consequences	 of	 following	 the	 rule.	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 best	 rule	 to	 follow	 is	 not	
always	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow	(cf.	Lasonen-Aarnio	2010;	Schoenfield	2015).	
When	 we	 evaluate	 rules	 for	 epistemic	 rationality,	 we’re	 concerned	 solely	
with	their	expected	consequences	for	how	well	you	succeed	in	proportioning	your	
beliefs	to	your	evidence.	From	an	evidentialist	perspective,	the	best	rule	to	follow	
is	 the	 evidentialist	 rule,	 “Always	 proportion	 your	 beliefs	 to	 your	 evidence!”	
However,	this	is	not	always	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow	when	you	have	evidence	
that	you	are	likely	to	fail.	It	is	counterproductive	to	try	to	follow	the	evidentialist	
rule	when	this	is	likely	to	make	you	less	responsive	to	your	evidence.	In	such	cases,	
there	may	be	greater	expected	value	in	trying	to	follow	some	alternative	strategy.	
By	ideal	standards,	epistemic	rationality	always	requires	following	the	evidentialist	
rule,	 since	 this	 is	 the	 best	 rule	 to	 follow.	 By	 non-ideal	 standards,	 however,	
epistemic	 rationality	 sometimes	 requires	 following	 a	 non-evidentialist	 rule	when	
this	is	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow.	
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Now	 let’s	 apply	 this	 distinction	 to	 our	 example.	 By	 ideal	 standards	 of	
epistemic	rationality,	Watson	should	believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	
that	 the	 butler	 is	 guilty	 and	 that	 his	 evidence	 supports	 this	 conclusion.	And	 yet	
Watson	is	a	non-ideal	agent	who	is	always	capable	of	achieving	these	demanding	
epistemic	 standards.	 In	 hard	 cases,	 he	 is	 unable	 to	 follow	 his	 evidence	where	 it	
leads.	 Moreover,	 he	 has	 enough	 higher-order	 evidence	 about	 his	 own	 cognitive	
limitations	to	know	this	about	himself.	So	he	knows	that	it’s	counterproductive	to	
try	to	respect	his	evidence	in	hard	cases,	since	the	expected	consequence	is	that	he	
will	 manifest	 grossly	 irrational	 dispositions.	 It	 makes	 more	 sense	 to	 adopt	 the	
cautious	epistemic	policy	of	remaining	agnostic	in	hard	cases,	although	he	knows	
in	 advance	 that	 this	 strategy	will	 diverge	 from	 the	 epistemic	 ideal.	Nevertheless,	
adopting	this	strategy	is	a	reasonable	response	to	his	higher-order	evidence	about	
his	cognitive	limitations.	
The	 key	 point	 is	 that	 our	 intuitions	 about	 what	 people	 “should”	 believe	
don’t	 always	 track	 what	 their	 evidence	 supports.	 There	 is	 an	 intuitive	 sense	 in	
which	Watson	 should	 remain	 agnostic	 about	 the	 first-order	question	of	whether	
the	butler	 is	guilty	and	 the	higher-order	question	of	what	his	evidence	supports.	
However,	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 that	 his	 evidence	 supports	 agnosticism	 about	 either	
first-order	or	higher-order	questions.	It’s	easy	to	overlook	this	point	unless	we	pay	
careful	 attention	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 ideal	 and	 non-ideal	 standards	 of	
epistemic	rationality.	
	
6. Epistemic	Dilemmas?	
Are	 there	 epistemic	 dilemmas	 in	which	 the	 requirements	 of	 ideal	 and	non-ideal	
rationality	 come	 into	 conflict?	 The	 whole	 point	 of	 distinguishing	 these	
requirements	 is	 that	 they	 can	 diverge,	 since	 ideal	 rationality	 always	 requires	
respecting	 your	 evidence,	 whereas	 non-ideal	 rationality	 sometimes	 requires	
disrespecting	your	evidence.	For	example,	Watson	is	required	by	ideal	standards	to	
believe	what	his	evidence	supports	–	namely,	that	the	butler	is	guilty	–	although	he	
is	 required	 by	 non-ideal	 standards	 to	 remain	 agnostic.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 epistemic	
dilemma	 in	 the	 strict	 sense,	 however,	 since	 there	 is	 no	 univocal	 sense	 in	which	
Watson	ought	and	ought	not	to	believe	this	conclusion.	There’s	one	sense	in	which	
he	 ought	 to	 believe	 it	 and	 another	 sense	 in	 which	 he	 ought	 to	 withhold	 belief.	
There	are	no	epistemic	dilemmas	in	which	you	ought	in	the	same	sense	to	pursue	
logically	incompatible	options.	
This	 bears	 comparison	 with	 Worsnip’s	 (2018a)	 equivocation	 strategy	 for	
solving	 our	 puzzle.	 He	 avoids	 epistemic	 dilemmas	 by	 denying	 that	 there	 is	 any	
single	sense	in	which	you	ought	to	respect	your	evidence	and	to	remain	coherent.	
Unlike	Worsnip,	however,	I	reject	the	bifurcationist	assumption	that	your	evidence	
can	support	incoherent	beliefs.	On	my	unificationist	proposal,	there	is	no	conflict	
between	 evidence	 and	 coherence,	 or	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements,	but	only	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements.	Ideal	rationality	
always	 requires	both	coherence	and	respecting	your	evidence,	whereas	non-ideal	
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rationality	 sometimes	 requires	 violating	 these	 ideals.	 Let	 me	 close	 with	 some	
reasons	for	preferring	this	view.	
First,	 unificationism	 preserves	 the	 attractive	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 unified	
virtue	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 that	 incorporates	 both	 substantive	 and	 structural	
dimensions.	As	we	noted	at	the	outset,	epistemically	rational	thinkers	are	not	only	
coherent	 but	 also	 respect	 their	 evidence.	 On	 the	 unificationist	 view,	 this	 is	 no	
mere	 coincidence,	 since	 respecting	 your	 evidence	 guarantees	 coherence.	 The	
virtue	of	epistemic	rationality	is	to	hold	beliefs	that	cohere	with	substantive	facts	
about	 your	 evidence	 in	 accordance	 with	 structural	 facts	 about	 the	 evidential	
support	 relation.	According	 to	bifurcationism,	 in	 contrast,	 there	 are	 two	distinct	
virtues	 corresponding	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements,	but	there	is	nothing	that	unifies	them	in	a	single	virtue	of	epistemic	
rationality.	We	might	decide	 to	 call	 someone	 ‘epistemically	 rational’	 only	 if	 they	
satisfy	both	kinds	of	requirements.	But	this	doesn’t	pick	out	any	unified	virtue,	as	
opposed	 to	 a	 gerrymandered	 conjunction	 of	 distinct	 virtues.	 Decomposing	
epistemic	rationality	in	this	way	seems	like	a	theoretical	last	resort.	
Second,	 we	 do	 not	 compromise	 the	 unity	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 by	
drawing	a	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	requirements.	On	the	version	of	
rule	consequentialism	outlined	in	§5,	non-ideal	rationality	is	a	matter	of	adopting	
strategies	 that	 have	 the	 greatest	 expected	 value	when	 evaluated	 by	 standards	 of	
ideal	 rationality.	 Hence,	 non-ideal	 rationality	 is	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
conduciveness	 towards	 ideal	 rationality.	 Ideal	 and	 non-ideal	 requirements	 of	
epistemic	 rationality	ultimately	 flow	 from	the	same	normative	 source.	According	
to	 bifurcationism,	 in	 contrast,	 substantive	 and	 structural	 requirements	 are	 two	
distinct	and	sui	generis	sources	of	normativity.	
Third,	unificationism	is	more	parsimonious.	Every	normative	theory	needs	
some	version	of	 the	 ideal/non-ideal	distinction	to	account	 for	cases	 in	which	the	
expected	 value	 of	 trying	 to	 follow	 its	 requirements	 diverges	 from	 the	 expected	
value	of	successfully	following	them.	In	such	cases,	there	is	an	ideal	sense	in	which	
you	 should	 follow	 its	 requirements,	 but	 there	 is	 a	 non-ideal	 sense	 in	which	 you	
should	do	otherwise	when	this	has	greater	expected	value.	Bifurcationism	doesn’t	
obviate	 the	 need	 for	 this	 distinction:	 if	 we	 divorce	 substantive	 and	 structural	
requirements,	 then	 we	 need	 to	 distinguish	 further	 between	 ideal	 and	 non-ideal	
species	of	each	genus.	Hence,	unificationism	retains	 the	advantage	of	 theoretical	
parsimony.	We	 cannot	 simply	 trade	 the	distinction	between	 ideal	 and	non-ideal	
requirements	for	the	distinction	between	substantive	and	structural	requirements.	
These	distinctions	don’t	do	the	same	kind	of	theoretical	work.	
Fourth,	 unificationism	 explains	 how	 there	 can	 be	 epistemic	 value	 in	
disrespecting	your	evidence.	As	we’ve	seen,	bifurcationism	struggles	to	explain	the	
value	 of	 coherence	 when	 it	 comes	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	 In	
contrast,	 unificationism	 does	 a	 better	 job	 of	 explaining	 the	 value	 of	 non-ideal	
rationality	when	it	diverges	from	the	epistemic	ideal	of	respecting	your	evidence.	
There	is	value	in	non-ideal	rationality	because	it	maximizes	your	expected	degree	
of	 responsiveness	 to	 your	 evidence	 given	 your	higher-order	 evidence	 about	 your	
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cognitive	limitations.	Hence,	the	value	of	non-ideal	rationality	can	be	explained	in	
evidentialist	terms.	
Finally,	 unificationism	 explains	 our	 intuitions	 about	 cases	 with	 minimal	
mutilation	of	plausible	theoretical	principles.	We	can	explain	the	intuitive	sense	in	
which	Watson	should	remain	agnostic	about	the	murder,	despite	the	fact	that	his	
evidence	incriminates	the	butler.	This	intuition	tracks	a	non-ideal	requirement	of	
epistemic	rationality,	which	permits	Watson	to	respond	to	higher-order	evidence	
about	his	 own	 cognitive	 limitations	by	 adopting	 strategies	 that	 deviate	 from	 the	
epistemic	ideal.	At	the	same	time,	however,	we	can	retain	the	plausible	theoretical	
principle	that	epistemic	rationality	always	requires	respecting	your	evidence,	since	
evidentialism	is	true	of	the	ideal	requirements	of	epistemic	rationality.	In	this	way,	
the	 distinction	 between	 ideal	 and	 non-ideal	 rationality	 allows	 us	 to	 reconcile	
intuition	and	theory	without	making	recourse	to	bifurcationism.	
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